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1. Introduction
Emergence is much discussed by both philosophers and scientists. But, as noted by Mitchell 
(2012), there is a significant gulf; philosophers and scientists talk past each other. We contend 
that this is because philosophers and scientists typically mean different things by emergence, lead-
ing us to distinguish being emergence and pattern emergence. While related to distinctions offered 
by others between, for example, strong/weak emergence or epistemic/ontological emergence 
(Clayton, 2004, pp. 9–11), we argue that the being vs. pattern distinction better captures what 
the two groups are addressing. In identifying pattern emergence as the central concern of 
scientists, however, we do not mean that pattern emergence is of no interest to philosophers. 
Rather, we argue that philosophers should attend to, and even contribute to, discussions of 
pattern emergence. But it is important that this discussion be distinguished, not conflated, 
with discussions of being emergence. In the following section we explicate the notion of being 
emergence and show how it has been the focus of many philosophical discussions, historical and 
contemporary. In section 3 we turn to pattern emergence, briefly presenting a few of the ways 
it figures in the discussions of scientists (and philosophers of science who contribute to these 
discussions in science). Finally, in sections 4 and 5, we consider the relevance of pattern emer-
gence to several central topics in philosophy of biology: the emergence of complexity, of con-
trol, and of goal-directedness in biological systems.
2. Being emergence
Being is a very old subject in philosophy and has been at the center of the branch of philoso-
phy known as metaphysics. Roughly, the more real something is, the more being it has. Physical 
objects are thought to be real to a degree that imaginary objects are not. Philosophers disagree 
about whether it makes sense to talk about things being more real or less real than others, but 
such debates are nowadays usually carried out not directly in terms of “being” but in terms of 
ontology. An ontological scheme defines what types of entities there are (i.e., what ontological categories 
entities can fall into) and how they are related. Instead of talking about entities of one ontological 
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category being “more real” than another, it is now more common for philosophers to say that 
one ontological category is “more fundamental” or “grounded by” the other, or that the one 
ontologically “reduces to” the other. However, this represents more of a superficial shift in word 
choice than a substantial shift in topic.
The idea of levels of being, with the denizens of some levels of being dependent on those at 
lower levels, is traceable at least to Aristotle, who argued that metaphysics, as the inquiry into 
being qua being, provided the most fundamental knowledge:
[H]e who knows best about each genus must be able to state the most certain principles 
of his subject, so that he whose subject is being qua being must be able to state the most 
certain principles of all things. This is the philosopher.
(Metaphysics, 1005b9 –11)
Fundamental to inquiry for Aristotle was determining the true categories of being, with primary 
substance – “that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject” (Categories, 2a14) – providing 
the foundation because “if the primary substances did not exist it would be impossible for any 
of the other things to exist” (ibid, 2b6).
Despite his departures from Aristotle and the scholastic tradition on many topics, Descartes 
also defended the idea of levels of being – “there are various degrees of reality or being: a sub-
stance has more reality than an accident or a mode” (CSM 2, p. 117). For Descartes, a single 
category of being was fundamental: God. Subordinate to God were the categories of mind 
(thinking substance) and body (corporeal substance). These latter two were “really distinct,” that 
is, ontologically independent: “two substances are said to be really distinct when each of them can 
exist apart from the other” (CSM 2, p. 114). When characterizing knowledge, Descartes empha-
sized the importance of knowing what is foundational. He thus gave voice to two ideas that have 
played an important role in subsequent philosophy: 1) that in order to have true knowledge, we 
must know what is fundamental in terms of being and 2) what is prior in terms of being cannot 
come from (i.e., cannot emerge from) what is posterior in terms of being.
When Descartes addressed knowledge of the physical world, he defended a mechanistic perspec-
tive which derived explanations of compound objects from the properties of their corpuscles. This 
emphasis on constitution was also developed by Locke, who traced the essence of a thing (“the very 
being of anything, whereby it is what it is”, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, III.iii.15) to 
its constitution, “which is the foundation of all those properties that are combined in, and are con-
stantly found to co-exist with the nominal essence; that particular constitution which everything 
has within itself, without any relation to anything without it” (III.iv.6). While acknowledging that 
we do not know “the internal constitution, whereon their properties depend . . . that texture of 
parts . . . that makes lead and antimony fusible, wood and stones not” (III.iv.9), he nonetheless 
assigned them priority both in terms of being and knowledge.
The tradition of Descartes and Locke continues in those contemporaries, exemplified by Kim, 
who treat the properties at the lowest level of composition as the foundation of the being of all 
compound entities that provides the explanation for all compound entities. Those who oppose 
being dependence and being reduction then argue for some version of being emergence.
We can chart these positions by defining the being and being-dependence of any entity:
The being of X =def : If the ontological category of X is C, then the being of X is whatever 
it is about X that allows it to count as an instance of C.
Y is being-dependent on X =def : Y’s counting as an instance of ontological category C1 is 
dependent on X’s counting as an instance of ontological category C2 (for some C1 and C2).
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With these definitions on the table, we can make more precise the conceptions of reduction and 
emergence that Kim and many others employ. First, ontological category X reduces to ontological 
category Y if the being of X is all there is to the being of Y. An example will clarify. Suppose one 
type of particle, called an X particle, is made up of smaller particles, known as Y particles. Some-
thing counts as a Y particle if it meets the criteria for a Y particle; in other words, if certain facts 
obtain. This is also true of an X particle: something only counts as an X particle if the criteria for 
X particles are met. Now suppose you have a collection of Y particles that form an X particle. 
If the facts that allow the collection of Y particles to count as an X particle are nothing over and 
above the facts that allow the collection of Y particles to count as a collection of Y particles, then 
X particles reduce to Y particles. But if the obtaining of the latter set of facts is only dependent 
on, not identical to, the obtaining of the former set of facts, then Y is being-dependent on X but 
not reducible to X. Reduction in this sense (we will use the term “being-reduction”) entails 
being-dependence, but being-dependence does not entail being-reduction.
If X is being-dependent on Y but X does not reduce to Y, then X emerges from Y. Like reduc-
tion, emergence is a relation with two relata: the emergence base, from which something is said 
to emerge, and the emergent, that which has emerged. If X particles were emergent in this sense 
(i.e., being-emergent) from Y particles, this would mean that there would be more to the facts that 
allow the collection of Y particles to count as an X particle than merely the facts that allow the 
collection of Y particles to count as a collection of Y particles.
Philosophers have used a variety of other terms for being-dependence: ontological depend-
ence, ontological ground, substrate, ontological priority, realization, constitution, truth-maker, 
componency, noncausal determination, compositional relation, etc. All of these capture the 
idea that the being of higher-level entities is dependent on those at a lower level. Issues about 
being-dependence are sometimes raised in terms of “determination,” “explanation,” or the abil-
ity to completely “account for” one ontological category in terms of others. For example, are 
higher-level entities something more than the components that constitute them or “completely 
determined by” their constituents? Is a chemical element, such as carbon, completely “accounted 
for” in terms of the protons, neutrons, and electrons that constitute it? Or are mental states 
completely “accounted for” in terms of the neurons and other cells that constitute a person’s 
brain? Discussions of downward causation are usually centered around being emergence: Do whole 
entities (e.g., living cells) have properties “over and above” those supplied by their components 
(genes, proteins, etc.) such that they can have causal effects “independent of” the effects of their 
constituents? This issue has acquired urgency in the wake of Kim’s (e.g., 1999) arguments to the 
effect that all causation can be “adequately accounted” at the most basic level – assuming that 
the most basic level is closed so that all effects are determined by causal processes between the 
occupants at that level – and any causation attributed to wholes built from these constituents is 
“redundant.” Thus, there is nothing to be “explained” in terms of the activities of the wholes. 
The only way, in Kim’s analysis, for minds to exhibit independent causal effects is if dualism is 
true and minds are neither reducible to nor being-dependent on physical things.
3. Pattern emergence
Having clarified the notion of being emergence, we set it aside. When scientists take up 
the concepts of emergence and reduction, they are typically not concerned with being and 
whether the being of one entity can be completely accounted for in terms of its constituents. 
In part this is due to the focus of scientists on ontology-neutral explanation – on accounting 
for the phenomena they encounter without taking a metaphysical stance on the underlying 
ontology. Unlike contemporary philosophers, scientists have to a large extent moved on from 
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the Ancient Greek notion that pursuit of knowledge requires the pursuit for more fundamental 
levels of being.
Bogen and Woodward (1988) characterize phenomena as repeatable occurrences in the world 
involving particular types of entities. Although the ontological status of the entities involved 
may be important for some purposes, phenomena also depend critically on how the entities are 
organized. The same organization can occur among entities regardless of their ontological status. 
Accordingly, in studying organization, researchers can and often do abstract from considera-
tions about which things are “more real” and focus on patterns exhibited in the phenomena. 
Explaining a pattern requires an account of how it was generated. Researchers come to treat 
some patterns as emergent when one cannot account for their generation in the same manner as 
patterns regarded as more basic. Since patterns are abstract and can be analyzed in disregard of the 
ontological status of their elements, discussions of pattern emergence are not focused on being.
Studying patterns and their emergence has become important for a wide range of fields over 
the last several decades. Condensed matter physics deals with “emergent” critical phenomena 
such as superconductivity, superfluidity, and ferromagnetism. Prigogine pioneered the concept 
of dissipative structures to understand the emergence of systems that maintain stability far from 
equilibrium. Chaos theory was developed to understand systems that generate complex and 
unpredictable, yet determinate, behavior from simple dynamical rules. Mandelbrot developed 
fractal geometry to understand the emergence of self-similar patterns in nature. Catastrophe the-
ory was developed to understand systems that generate significant or complex effects from simple 
or minor perturbations; catastrophe theory is part of the more general field of nonlinear systems 
and complexity theory that examines the mathematics of a wide range of emergent phenomena. 
Neural network theory deals with systems capable of exhibiting intelligent or adaptive behavior 
based on nodes that interact in simple ways. Developmental biology is concerned with emergent 
processes in morphogenesis and tries to understand how from natural selection and environ-
mental constraints complex biological structures and functions can develop. The field of genetic 
algorithms draws from concepts like evolution and natural selection to develop algorithms that 
are employed in information processing applications such as optimization and search.
What the areas listed here (sometimes labeled collectively as the “complexity sciences”; Stein, 
1989) have in common is that particular patterns emerge as entities are configured in particular 
ways. The emergence of patterns can be addressed independently of questions about ontological 
fundamentality, or about what is “more real” than what is not. We can recognize the concern 
with pattern even in some of the statements of philosophers whose primary focus is on being. 
Sider states:
Consider questions of ontology, for example. There has been much discussion recently 
of whether tables and chairs and other composite material objects exist. It is gener-
ally common ground in these discussions that there exist subatomic particles that are 
“arranged tablewise” and “arranged chairwise”; the controversy is over whether there 
exist in addition tables and chairs that are composed of the particles.
(2011, p. 7)
The concern with pattern is captured in the reference to a tablewise arrangement of particles. 
Moreover, we can establish whether or not there is such a pattern independently of addressing 
questions about whether a level of reality is fundamental and whether any particular arrangement 
of fundamental stuff will count as an entity. A tablewise arrangement is an example of a pattern, 
albeit perhaps not a particularly interesting one. Moreover, it is not itself an ontological category; 
rather, patterns are candidates for ontological categories depending on what instantiates them. 
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Patterns are a central concern for scientists, who investigate how they come about from simpler 
patterns, what are their properties, etc. Conway’s Game of Life (Berlekamp, Conway, & Guy, 
2004, chapter 25) illustrates these questions. The Game of Life is laid out on a grid of squares, 
and simple rules that take into account the state of neighboring squares at a previous instance 
determine whether a given square is on or off. Given some initial arrangements of on-squares, 
enduring patterns such as gliders emerge that move as a unit across the grid. Gliders exist, and 
their emergence and behavior are objects of investigations without raising questions of what type 
of being they enjoy. Given the gap between the rules that govern squares in the Game of Life and 
the behavior of gliders, some might view gliders as emergent patterns.
4. Some approaches to characterizing pattern emergence
There are parallels between discussions of being emergence and pattern emergence. With pattern 
emergence, there is again an emergence base and an emergent: the emergent pattern is in some 
way dependent on the emergence base pattern. The emergent pattern is also, in some sense, 
something more than the emergence base pattern. The sense in which the emergent pattern is 
“something more” differs between contexts, but recently some authors have explored whether 
there is more to say about what the interesting cases of pattern emergence from the various 
fields listed earlier have in common, and have taken important steps towards understanding 
general principles of pattern emergence. With pattern emergence, as with being emergence, the 
criteria can be ontic, epistemic, semantic, etc. But it is important to keep the criterial dimension 
(sometimes also referred to as the “weak/strong” dimension) separate from the being/pattern 
dimension.1 In the following subsections we review the proposals of several theorists who aspire 
to develop a general theory of pattern emergence that would enable insights about how patterns 
that emerge in one field (e.g., theoretical biology) can be applied to pattern emergence in another 
(e.g., computer science).
4.1. Pattern emergence as bifurcation
Hooker analyzes pattern emergence from the standpoint of dynamical systems theory (DST), a 
powerful framework for understanding how any kind of system (whether discrete or continuous) 
changes over time. Central to DST is the concept of a state space, “an abstract mathematical space 
of points where each point is assumed to represent a possible state of the target system” (Bishop, 
2012, p. 4). One can then represent the history of the system as a trajectory from an initial state 
to a final state and employ mathematical tools to analyze the trajectory. What makes DST appro-
priate is that 1) pattern emergence is usually considered to be something that occurs (or can be 
modeled as occurring) over time; 2) DST, like the notion of a “pattern,” can be applied to any 
system of elements (as long as they can be described in terms of a state space), regardless of their 
intrinsic nature; and 3) DST models characterize change in a system using mathematical equa-
tions, which assumes that in some sense information about how the system changes over time is 
compressible (i.e., that it is organized into patterns).
In Hooker’s view, we can look at pattern formation as a spectrum running from trivial cases 
such as the assembly of legs and a top into a table to the emergence of patterns through highly 
complex processes like biological evolution and creative intelligence. The challenge is to specify 
when it is useful to appeal to emergence. Hooker rejects epistemic criteria for emergent patterns 
as problematically subjective, and instead argues in favor of conceptualizing pattern emergence 
in terms of what is referred to as bifurcation in dynamics, “for then a new behavioural pattern 
develops, and one whose occurrence is dynamically grounded in a shift in dynamical form” 
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(2011, p. 209). What Hooker means by a “shift in dynamical form” is that “a differently struc-
tured dynamical equation is required to model the behaviours and the pattern of all possible 
trajectories (the flow) changes” (2013, p. 759). The appeal to equations does not, however, imply 
that Hooker is invoking a semantic, epistemic, or otherwise mind-dependent criterion. New 
equations are required as a result of the introduction of constraints, which are objective features 
of the system itself.
The idea of constraints stems from classical dynamics. Newton’s laws fully characterize the 
behavior of any particle, but they specify each particle’s behavior in terms of six variables for 
the six degrees of freedom it enjoys. Macro-scale objects result from constraints that restrict the 
degrees of freedom. For example, when two particles are bound together, the particles are con-
strained to move together. When water molecules are constrained by a pipe, they are restricted 
to moving in the direction of the pipe. In some cases, one can incorporate the constraints into 
the equations describing the particles’ behavior, but in other cases, one cannot. One cannot, for 
example, derive the equations Maxwell developed for governors (feedback systems) from basic 
Newtonian equations.
4.2. Pattern emergence as nonlinearity or instability
Hooker’s appeal to “differently structured” dynamical equations leaves open a variety of ways to 
specify the difference other than bifurcations. Bishop (2012), for example, similarly appeals to 
the DST framework to account for emergence, but appeals to the distinction between linear and 
nonlinear dynamical equations. A linear equation exhibits superposition: the output of an opera-
tion on a variable α is proportional to α. When superposition fails, the equation is nonlinear. In 
the context of a physical system described by such equations, Bishop states: 
this failure corresponds to a system’s output not changing proportionally to any change 
in input. The phenomenon of sensitive dependence – the smallest change in the initial 
conditions can issue forth in a drastic change in a system’s behaviour – registers this 
non-proportional response. 
(2012, p. 4) 
One reason nonlinearity is an interesting point of demarcation is that one can decompose 
systems described by linear equations into their parts, analyze each independently, and then 
sum together the results. As Bishop comments, “Reductionist lore tends to work well for such 
systems.” But reductionist strategies are insufficient with nonlinear systems since they respond 
differently to different inputs given the constraints, which determine the whole. Nonlinear 
systems often exhibit self-organizing properties: “The interplay between parts and wholes in 
complex systems and their environments typically leads to the self-organization observed in 
such systems” (2012, p. 6).2
Most traditional scientific analyses have focused on systems that maintain stability under 
perturbations. Some nonlinear systems, such as two-dimensional planetary systems, are stable, 
but many are not. Schmidt (2011) argues that nonlinear systems that exhibit instability should 
be counted as emergent. Stability and instability, though, come in various forms. Schmidt char-
acterizes three kinds of stability that, when violated, give rise to emergence: static, dynamic, and 
structural. Static instability results from sensitivity to initial conditions at a single point or region 
of a state space, where “the alternative trajectories from two nearby initial points separate and 
will never again become neighbors” (2011, p. 228). Dynamic instability begins less localized: 
“nearly all points in the state space exhibit the property of sensitivity: the trajectories separate 
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exponentially by time evolution” (2011, p. 229). In other words, a dynamical instability is exhib-
ited when the system as a whole is chaotic. A Lorenz system is an example of this: almost all 
initial conditions lead to chaotic solutions. Finally, Schmidt defines structural instability as a kind 
of higher-order instability: if one were to perturb the structure of a system (i.e., its equations or 
laws) slightly, then “the overall dynamics changes qualitatively” (2011, p. 230).
4.3. Complementarity
Pattee agrees that dynamical conditions such as bifurcation, nonlinearity, and instability provide 
for important types of pattern emergence, but contends they do not capture the form of pattern 
emergence found in living systems. These dynamical conditions exhibit rate-dependent phe-
nomena. But he argued that biology also generates rate-independent phenomena. The switching 
of a light switch provides a simple example of a rate-independent phenomenon. Flipping the 
switch requires the application of a certain threshold level of energy to the switch, but once it is 
flipped, the light is turned on or off independently of the energy applied to the switch. Dynam-
ical information about the speed with which it is flipped is filtered out by the system and is 
irrelevant to the resulting behavior. Only a binary signal is sent to the light from the switch, with 
no information about the rate at which the switch was flipped. (See Rosen, 1969, for a similar 
development of the complementarity of multiple descriptions.)
Pattee argued that rate-independence is common in biological systems. For example, mol-
ecules act as signals, that is, the molecules consistently have a specific effect, regardless of when 
they are received by a consumer. Rate-independence is important for many kinds of biological 
processes: examples include sensor transduction, gene transcription and translation, error cor-
rection, enzymatic recognition, any type of memory, and any type of regulation or control. A 
general theory of pattern emergence needs to be able to account for the emergence of these 
types of organization.
Pattee (1987) argued that rate-independence can give rise to the emergence of informational 
constraints, in which the information carried by a state, not its dynamics, constrains behavior. Infor-
mation constraints are distinct from but complementary to dynamical nonlinearity/instability:
Although it is true that dynamical theory and symbolic information are not associated 
in our normal way of thinking, they are epistemologically complementary concepts that 
are nevertheless both essential for a general theory of biological self- organization. More-
over, instabilities are the most favorable condition of a dynamical physical system for the 
origin of nondynamical informational constraints, and the evolution of self-organizing 
strategies at all levels of biology require the complementary interplay of dynamical 
(rate-dependent) regimes with instabilities and nondynamic (rate- independent, nonin-
tegrable) informational constraints.
(1987, p. 198)
Although they complement one another, Pattee contended that one cannot describe or model 
rate-dependent dynamical and rate-independent informational constraints in the same vocab-
ulary. The vocabulary that describes a switch as “closing” or “opening” is different from the 
vocabulary that refers to the velocity with which the switch was moved. He characterized the 
complementarity as semantic closure, a type of closure in which rate-dependent constraints are 
dependent on rate-independent constraints, and vice versa, within the same system. The switch 
must be moved with some velocity in order to close it. Engineering regularly takes advantage 
of the complementarity of different descriptions of a system. To analyze an electrical circuit 
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involving switches, one ignores rate-dependent features and treats them as rate-independent. 
Rate-independence is even more fundamental in biology.
5. Pattern emergence applications
Two emergent features of living systems that are challenging to explain are hierarchical control 
and goal-directedness. We briefly consider how Pattee’s framework of treating rate-dependent 
and rate-independent features as complementary provides a way of understanding these forms 
of pattern emergence.
5.1. Control
When a system is considered purely in terms of dynamical physical laws, there is no possibility 
of control. Every detail of what happens is determined by the laws, and no freedom is left open 
to a controller to make use of: 
[T]he forces that enter the equations of motion determine the change in time of the 
state of the system as closely as determinism is allowed by physical theory. The whole 
concept of physical theory is based on the belief that the motions or states of matter are 
neither free nor chaotic, but governed by universal laws. 
(1973, p. 85) 
If there is no freedom to move in different ways, there seems to be no role for control. Pattee’s 
solution at first seems counterintuitive: the possibility of control only arises though “some selec-
tive loss of detail” (1973, p. 80).
The challenge, then, is to explain how “‘selective loss of detail’ can lead to hierarchical control 
instead of the usual loss of order in the system” (Pattee, 1973, p. 81). This results from describing 
the system in a way that leaves out detail. This is what we do when we speak of the degrees of 
freedom available to a particle. Only in that context can we identify constraints that limit those 
degrees of freedom. In abstracting from detail, we abandon the lowest level, where everything is 
determined, and adopt what Pattee speaks of as a higher level of description:
[T]he physicist’s idea of constraint is not a microscopic concept. The forces of con-
straint to a physicist are unavoidably associated with a new hierarchical level of descrip-
tion. Whenever a physicist adds an equation of constraint to the equations of motion, he 
is really writing in two languages at the same time. The equation of motion language 
relates the detailed trajectory or state of the system to dynamical time, whereas the 
constraint language is not about the same type of system at all, but another situation in 
which dynamical detail has been purposely ignored, and in which the equation of motion 
language would be useless. . . . A constraint requires an alternative description.
(1973, pp. 85–86)
Why would a scientist ever opt for less detail than is possible? One reason is to characterize 
macroscopic objects. Macroscopic objects, whether tables or organisms, are not identified in 
the lower-level dynamical account. They are patterns that can only be identified by recognizing 
freedom of motion and how this freedom is constrained. They arise in a higher-level language.
Talk of abstraction and languages is usually associated with cognitive activity of observing minds. 
The talk of constraints and control, however, is intended to refer to something that can operate 
independently of any mind. The relevant abstracting and imposing of constraints is not done by the 
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scientist, but occurs in the very systems being described. This requires things in that system that can 
classify “microscopic degrees of freedom of the lower level it controls” (Pattee, 1973, p. 89) – that is, 
treat different conditions specified at the lower level as the same – and then apply the same rule to all 
instances. Exercising control, Pattee argues, requires that the system 1) classify situations (Pattee’s gen-
eral term for this is “measurement”), 2) make a record (or representation) of what was classified, and 3) 
respond differentially in light of the record (i.e., the record must be “read out inside the system,” 1970, 
p. 132). These together generate what Pattee in the passage earlier from 1987 referred to as infor-
mational constraints. Together, Pattee refers to this as a classification- record-control process (1970, p. 132).
Pattee argues that these conditions are met even in enzymes. An enzyme classifies substrate 
molecules, changes its conformation when it binds to one with the right shape, and then catalyzes 
a reaction. The enzyme thereby controls the reaction. The importance of this is even clearer with 
allosteric enzymes. By binding with one molecule that results from a different reaction, such an 
enzyme changes how it catalyzes a given reaction. It is thereby sensitive to information about 
other conditions in the cell than the presence of its substrate. Such an arrangement is also present 
in the interaction of a neuron with a muscle: the muscle contracts when it recognizes an incom-
ing neurotransmitter, represents this information in a calcium store, and uses that representation 
to release actin and myosin to slide along each other. In such systems, we can talk about control 
as existing in an observer-independent, intrinsic way within the system, because the system itself 
(and its capacity for classifying, recording, and interpreting its own records) defines the necessary 
complementary mode of description.
5.2. Goal-directedness
The resources required to account for control also provide a basis for explaining the goal- 
directedness of biological systems, which has long been a point of contention between 
reductionists and emergentists. In part the controversy reflects ambiguity in what is meant 
by “goal- directedness.” McFarland (1989) usefully distinguishes three senses: goal-achieving, 
goal-seeking, and goal-directed systems. A goal-achieving system is “one which can recognize 
the goal once it is arrived at (or at least change its behaviour when it reaches the goal), but the 
process of arriving at the goal is largely determined by the environmental circumstances” (1989, 
p. 108). Such a system performs what Pattee calls “measurement,” but also progresses towards 
the goal by means of such measurements. A goal-seeking system progresses towards the goal as a 
result of its own organization or design. In doing so it may rely on what are sometimes called 
passive control systems (Milsum, 1966) that measure or represent information. Accordingly, nei-
ther goal-achieving nor goal-seeking systems exhibit control in the sense Pattee characterized. 
They pose no challenge for the reductionist, as they do not exhibit interesting pattern emergence.
Interesting pattern emergence arises with what McFarland defines as goal-directed systems 
since they both represent a goal and produce behavior in response to that representation:
In the paradigm case of goal-directed behaviour, the difference between the “desired” 
state of affairs and the actual state of affairs (as monitored in the negative feedback 
pathway) provides the (error) signal that actuates the behaviour-control mechanism.
(McFarland, 1989, p. 108)
What McFarland describes here is a form of negative feedback control: the system that measures 
some variable, compares it to a set-point value, and based on the comparison responds one way 
rather than another. This differs from the cases noted earlier in that it is a goal, not a state of the 
system or the environment, that is represented.
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What does it mean for a goal to be explicitly represented in a system such that its behav-
ior is governed by that representation? Dennett offers an ecumenical conception of explicit 
representation:
Let us say that information is represented explicitly in a system if and only if there actu-
ally exists in the functionally relevant place in the system a physically structured object, 
a formula or string or tokening of some members of a system (or “language”) of elements 
for which there is a semantics or interpretation, and a provision (a mechanism of some 
sort) for reading or parsing the formula. This definition of explicit representation is 
exigent, but still leaves room for a wide variety of representation systems. They need 
not be linear, sequential, sentence-like systems, but might, for instance, be “mapreading 
systems” or “diagram interpreters.”
(1987, p. 216)
What is crucial in this account of goal-directedness is the addition to Pattee’s account of control 
the intermediate step of directly comparing measurements of a system or environmental var-
iable with an internal “goal” state variable. Any system that selects behaviors based on such a 
comparison is a goal-directed system. Such goal-directed behavior is widespread in biology. It 
is exhibited, for example, in bacteria that “decide” whether or not to sporulate depending on 
certain variables, such as the concentration of intracellular GTP (guanosine triphosphate) falling 
in a specified range (Stephens, 1998).
Goal-directedness is a form of pattern emergence that provides for novel forms of behavior 
in organisms that exhibit it. The goal-directedness of bacteria may seem far removed from the 
goal-directedness of humans, but what Pattee argues is required in relatively simple biological 
systems – representations of goals – can be extended by extending the representational machin-
ery. Rosen (1985), for example, explored how representations of anticipated future states of a sys-
tem and its environment can be used to control the system in the present. More advanced forms 
of information processing, such as representing alternative futures and selecting between them, 
require additional representational machinery. The result is the emergence of different patterns 
of behavior, but the key, in Pattee’s analysis, is semantic closure that links the rate-independent 
informational constraints provided by a representation system to the fully determinate, rate- 
dependent, dynamical behavior at the lowest level.
6. Conclusions
In the past, scientists and philosophers have run into dead ends by conflating the emergence of 
phenomena like complexity, control, and goal-directedness with questions about the emergence 
of being. Increasingly philosophers and scientists who address the emergence of patterns inde-
pendently of the emergence of being are advancing interesting and useful accounts about when 
patterns emerge. We have sketched a few of these and then focused on one framework, attrib-
uted to Pattee, that offers potential for understanding the emergence of hierarchical control and 
goal-directedness in biology.
Notes
1 Humphreys (2016, p. 150) uses “pattern emergence” in a different sense from the one used here. In our 
terminology, Humphreys is referring to a certain type of semantic criterion for being emergence. Hum-
phreys subsumes “pattern emergence” under the larger category of “inferential emergence.” Something 
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like what we are calling “pattern emergence” is also briefly suggested by Clayton (2004, p. 17), but 
Clayton does not treat this as separate from other distinctions about emergence.
2 Linearity is one of four conditions Wimsatt (2007, pp. 280–281) offers for a system counting as aggre-
gative. The others are intersubstitution of parts, size scaling, and decomposition/reaggregation. When 
aggregativity fails, Wimsatt counts the behavior of the system as emergent.
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